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Pwd Sch LHQ

CONFERENCE GHQ 17 MAR 45

*APPX A*

OBSC ONE OPERATION

Present : GHQ, ANF and AAF representatives.  
Lieut Gen MORSHEAD, BGS and DAHQG 1 Aust Corps  
BGS and AAHQG Adv LHQ

Decisions:

1. Target dates for OBSC ONE and TWO remain at 29 Apr and 22 May respectively.
2. The following additional units are authorized for inclusion in troop lists :-
  - Pmr Bn - for garrison duties OBSC ONE objective
  - Tk A Regt - for labour for the operation ex OBSC ONE objective to new objective
  - MG Coy - for bde gp
  - MG Coy - for garrison duties OBSC ONE objective.
3. The following additional shipping will probably be available :-
  - 1 LSD - every possible effort to be made to make this available, with priority over all other objectives.
  - 3 LST - if available; otherwise subject to late adjustment
  - 1 AK - if asked for by 1 Aust Corps.
4. No amphibians are available (hence basis of assault becomes landing craft from LSIs)
5. Corps to consider whether all vehicles go to objective in assault lift, or even in follow up lift, or whether some can remain at staging area (e.g. bulk of vehicles of Tk A Regt could remain at MCROTAN).
6. 1 Beach Gp to be moved from AUST to MCROTAN for use in OBSC TWO. Corps to consider what adm troops can go direct to OBSC TWO objective area without staging.

NOTE re para 7

AAF agreed on 18 Mar for ground force comd to deal with only one Air HQ, i.e RAAF comd.

7. Ground Force HQ will deal direct with two air force HQs, viz RAAF Comd and 13 AF.
8. A Port Directorate (80 all ranks) is being considered for use in OBSC ONE.
9. Naval bombardment and decision as to break up of assault convoy is to be left to Ground and Naval Task Force Commanders.

Notes for GOC 1 Aust Corps for GHQ Conference

OBOP ONE

17 Mar 45.

Interdependence of the operations OBOP ONE, TWO and THREE

1. OBOP ONE cannot be planned without reference to OBOP TWO for the reasons that:-

- (a) The same division is carrying out this series of operations, and
- (b) The time interval between the operations is such that the troops employed in OBOP ONE cannot be counted on as being available for OBOP TWO, nor can those used in OBOP TWO be counted on as available for OBOP THREE.

2. Therefore neither 26 Bde Gp nor 2 Aust Beach Gp can be counted on for OBOP TWO on present timings, but could be available in time for OBOP THREE.

DATA

1. OBJECT and time factor in relation to the Air Support

The underlying object of OBOP ONE is presumably to activate the airfields in time to support OBOP TWO timed for P plus 23. This would entail the airfields being in full operation by about P plus 18 and remaining in operation until P plus 30 to cover the activation of airfields in OBOP TWO.

On this basis the Air Element must be maintained until P plus 30 which necessitates the use of the Beach Gp or some maintenance organisation to replace it.

2. Employment of 26 Bde and 2 Beach Gp in both OBOP ONE and TWO

Briefing for OBOP TWO would need to commence by P plus 16 and thereafter the garrison and maintenance organisation for OBOP ONE would be required to relieve 26 Bde and 2 Beach Gp by this date. As the follow up convoy would only be unloaded by this date, it is evident that units carried will not be available for operations in OBOP ONE and therefore the necessity for having all units required for operations in OBOP ONE in the Assault convoy.

3. OBOP TWO and OBOP THREE

- (a) On the present time table airfields to support OBOP THREE must be operative by P plus 6.
- (b) The Bde Gp and Beach Gp for OBOP THREE must be ready to load out of OBOP TWO about P plus 5 and therefore little if any use could be made of this group in OBOP TWO.

Force required for OBOP ONE

4. Enemy strength:

GHQ have agreed verbally to the increase in the assessment from 36/2900 to 4000.

5. Tonnages to be handled:

Exclusive of vehicles and stores loaded in vehicles planning has shown that an average DM tonnage of 1800 tons has to be cleared daily in the early stages of OBOP ONE. To effect this the full Beach Gp with one unit for labour is required.

6. Garrison and Maintenance Organisation:

A minimum of one unit and a MG Coy will be required as a garrison; in addition a small maintenance organisation to take over from the Beach Gp will be required.

7. Summarised this involves:

- (a) Full Bde Gp
- (b) Beach Gp with labour unit
- (c) Garrison of the Pnr Bn and the MG Coy
- (d) Small maintenance organisation

8. Insert page on Additional Shipping Requirements.

9. Amphibians

- (a) DUKWS - not trained for operational role and limited Aust reserves will be essential for administration later.
- (b) For two battalion assault require -
  - one coy LVT (Tractor)
  - one coy LVT(A)(Tanks)
- (c) No allotment of shipping to move ESE shipping.
- (d) 1 LSD, 1 APA, 3 LSI shown in MONTCLAIR as available for ferrying LC are not taken into account in OBOE ONE.

10. Of the additional shipping requested: -

The LSTs are for movement of the Amphibians,  
The LSD for the ESE craft,  
The AK for additional RAAF stores, and  
The LCI for the additional Army and Airforce personnel added in OBOE ONE staff study  
without corresponding increase in shipping.

Data

<u>MONTCLAIR Staff Study</u>	<u>OBOE ONE Staff Study</u>	<u>Additional</u>
13439 troops	17019 troops	3560 troops
1854 vehicles	2165 vehicles	541 vehicles
19260 tons stores	21893 tons stores	2733 tons stores

11. Discharge of shipping OBOE ONE

The Beach Gp and labour Bn capacity is 1800 tons DW (exclusive of vehicles and stores loaded in vehicles) daily with about 50% capacity on F Day.

The unloading of 10500 tons DW will take 6 days so that the last craft cannot be unloaded until F plus 5. For this reason the Assault convoy should be divided into two - one to arrive on F day and the second on F plus 3.

12. Reduction in Vehicle scalings:

- (a) Bde Gp is required for operations in either OBOE TWO or THREE. The breaking up of its organisation and leaving bits and pieces of its units in staging areas will only increase the difficulty of preparing the Brigade for its further operations.
- (b) Organisation based on roadless countries.
- (c) An exception to this is recommended in the case of the labour Bn (7½ A Regt). Its operational vehicles, guns, with small

maintenance party could remain at MCROTAI as they will not be required before OBOE FOUR.

13. Bombardment:

(a) Commencing P minus 5.

The bombardment should commence earlier to permit sabotage of tanks not destroyed by the bombardment and should include PAMOESIAN TANK BN.

Alternatively time may be required for a CHINESE attack to force the JAP to use his oil defence or so much of it as he still controls.

(b) Provision by USN of LCI(R) and (K) for the assault.

14. The nomination of the Air Force to control the air in the operation is required.

15. GHQ authority required for air photos for planning - (low obliques)

16. Date of P Day

By cutting out the rehearsal it is just possible to stage OBOE ONE on P Day, provided complete disembarkation is not further delayed than 15 April as at present estimated.

Should disembarkation be further delayed P Day would need to be moved a corresponding amount.

17. Addition units from AUSTRALIA.

As the one beach group cannot operate for both OBOE ONE and TWO, the second beach group must be moved forward.

To provide relief for the 26 Bde Gp and to garrison the island a Pmr Bn should be moved forward.

To ensure that a labour unit is available to 26 Bde should one be required for OBOE THREE (as may be expected) the Tk A Regt is required forward.

These movements require the provision of earlier but not additional shipping from AUSTRALIA.